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Article 1

Narrowing the Scope of Judicial Review for
Humanitarian Appeals of Deportation Orders
in Canada, New Zealand and the United
States
Dr. Timothy Philip Fadgen1, Dr. Guy Charlton2 and Dr. Mark
Kielsgard3

ABSTRACT
The paper will compare the humanitarian and
compassionate appeal provisions in relevant immigration law
allowed to deportees in Canada, New Zealand and the United
States. It argues that while recent changes in each of the countries
have preserved the humanitarian appeals process, the basis of the
appeal and judicial review have been dramatically narrowed by
changes in legislation and case law. These changes have
particularly limited the scope of judicial review and the ability of
the courts to overturn administrative decisions regarding the fitness
of an applicant to benefit from the appeal provisions.

I. INTRODUCTION
Immigration policy is inextricably linked to a nation’s
sovereignty as defining the desirable members of the community
within the territory is part of defining the nation itself.4 From this
1

Dr. Fadgen is a Fulbright-Clinton Fellow attached to the Attorney General of
Samoa and visiting research fellow at the University of Auckland.
2
Dr. Charlton is an Associate Professor of Law at City University of Hong
Kong.
3
Dr. Kielsgard is an Assistant Professor of Law at City University of Hong
Kong.
4
CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, MAKING PEOPLE ILLEGAL: WHAT GLOBALIZATION
MEANS FOR MIGRATION AND LAW (Cambridge University Press, 2008) (For a
discussion of the impact globalisation has had on immigration and nationality
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perspective, immigration policy is invariably bound up in notions of
state and national identity within the context of the international
system. As such, immigration scholar Cheryl Shanks argues that
changes in the international context are critical to understanding
immigration policy since these changes to migrant flows help to
crystallise a definition of “self” in the host country.5 Shanks argues
that identity and behaviour are critical elements as justifications for
regional or national quotas or as a basis for prohibiting migrants
bearing certain undesirable behavioural attributes. At the same time,
the rights and judicial protections accorded immigrants are often
different from those accorded citizens or other minorities.
Immigrants, deportees and “excluded” individuals are generally not
considered protected minorities who would be entitled to
appropriate equal protections and due process under domestic law.
Immigration policy and law, as bound up in sovereignty
prerogatives and foreign policy more generally, is left by the courts
to the political branches.
These notions are particularly evident in deportation or
removal situations. Deirdre Moloney defines deportation or removal
as a “state-mandated process by which non-citizen immigrants are
expelled from a nation and returned to their countries of origin after
residing in the state, on the basis of an administrative determination
that they have violated immigration policy or committed a crime.”6
Exclusion, on the other hand, is where someone seeking entry or
arriving in a state is turned away for a myriad of reasons, such as
possessing an invalid visa or having been convicted of certain
crimes in their country of origin.7 In addition to those forcibly
policy see Stephen Legomsky, The Last Bastions of State Sovereignty:
Immigration and Nationality go Global, in CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION:
IMMIGRATION, SOCIAL WELFARE, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 43 (Andrew Sobel ed.,
2009)).
5
CHERYL SHANKS, IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN
SOVEREIGNTY, 1890-1990, pp. 10-30 (2001).
6
DEIRDRE MOLONEY, NATIONAL INSURITIES: IMMIGRANTS AND U.S.
DEPORTATION POLICY SINCE 1882, at 8 (2012).
7
In 2013 the total number of individuals either removed or excluded from entry
to the U.S. numbered 358,000 Anthony Advincula, “US deported around 369,000
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removed, there are those who ‘voluntarily return’ to their country of
origin. This is typically done in response to apprehension and threat
of deportation or removal. Moloney further describes the removal
process as an “administrative, not criminal process and thus offers
insufficient enumerated protections for those facing hearings and
possible expulsion.”8
The criteria by which individuals are excluded by
deportation or exclusion for the state however, often times does not
preclude additional or equitable considerations where domestic
immigration law would warrant removal. Various international
legal instruments, constitutional texts and common law rights, plus
the “all-or-nothing” aspect of legal rules have preserved an area of
discretion for decisions-makers based on equitable and
humanitarian considerations. While such appeals are not afforded to
all individuals,9 these appeals, initially decided by the executive or
administrative appellate tribunals, are subject to only limited
judicial review. Moreover, in line with security-oriented and
identity-based national and international contexts,10 the scope of
these humanitarian appeals, both at the administrative and court
level, have decreased over the past several decades. In New
Zealand, the removal of the five-prong humanitarian test found in
sections 22 and 105 of the Immigration Act 1987 reduces the scope
of judicial review on immigration decisions as well as lessens the
impact of international law with the concomitant greater scope for
executive discretion.11 Given this wide new discretion and the low

immigrants
in
2013”
GLOBAL
NATION.NET
(Jan.
5,
2014)
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/95751/us-deported-around-369000-immigrantsin-2013.
8
MOLONEY, supra note 6, at 3.
9
See, e.g., individuals who have engaged in acts of terrorism or violating human
or international rights may not appeal an order under humanitarian considerations
in Canada. Section 64, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001, S.C., c. 64
(Can.) (hereinafter IRPA).
10
Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt & Peter J. Katzenstein, Norms,
Identity and Culture in National Security, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL
SECURITY 33 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996).
11
Immigration Act 1987, s. 22, 105 (N.Z.).
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Wednesbury standard of review12 employed by the courts in
immigration appeals, New Zealand’s internal human rights
commitments and international obligations are significantly
impacted, as is evident in the recent High Court opinion Babulal v.
Department of Labour.13 In Canada, the 2001 Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act excludes various classes of individuals for
humanitarian appeals and the Supreme Court of Canada recently
held that the courts should provide a measure of deference where a
particular decision has been allocated by Parliament to an
administrative decision-maker rather than to the courts.14 In the
United States (“U.S.”) efforts to restrict judicial intervention and
review have had a long history; most recently in 2005 when
Congress restricted habeas corpus review of immigration appeals to
the court of appeals.15
In Part II, III, and IV of this article we provide a brief
overview and discussion of each states immigration policies and
relevant laws. In Part V of this article we provide an in depth
comparative analysis to these three states immigration policies.
Finally in Part VI, we argue that as the scope and content of these
humanitarian appeals have narrowed Canada, New Zealand and the
U.S. may be unduly infringing upon rights guaranteed by
international instruments and domestic constitutional documents.

12

Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1947]
EWCA Civ 1 (holding, inter alia, that courts will defer to administrative decisionmaking unless the decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker
would arrive at that result).
13
Yatish Suresh Babulal v. Chief Executive, Department of Labour, CIV-2011404-1773.
14
Canada (Citzenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 (Can.).
15
Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial
Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1411 (1997); REAL ID
Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13.
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II. CANADA
A Brief Overview of Canadian Immigration Policy
Canada has increasingly welcomed immigrants over the past
several decades. It accepts more immigrants per capita and the
highest proportion of foreign-born residents (20.6%) than any other
G8 states.16 It also has a long-standing official policy of supporting
multiculturalism having officially embraced “multiculturalism
within a bilingual framework” in 1971. This policy, while asserting
that Canada had two official languages, observes that there is no
official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over
another, and helps minority groups to preserve their language and
culture.17 Indeed “Canadianess” is increasingly being defined as
incorporating “multiculturalism” within a tolerant and inclusive
society.18
Such was not always the case. While official government
narratives argue that two major constitutional documents, the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 and the Quebec Act set the basis for a
multicultural social framework that is solicitous to peoples of
different cultures, Canadian immigration policy has historically
been premised on the recruitment of “desirable” white northern
European immigrants and the exclusion of non-white non-European
“undesirable” immigrants.19 Initial immigration laws favoured
British and northern European individuals. This was consistent with
the nascent formation of Canadian identity as “British North
16

Statistics Canada: “Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity in Canada,
National Household Survey, 2011” Online: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/
multiculturalism/citizenship.asp (G8 states include France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the United Kingdom, the U.S., Canada and Russia).
17
See generally, Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada (1985) Education:
Cultural Pluralism in Canada, Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, at 15.
18
AUGIES FLERAS, THE POLITICS OF MULTICULTURALISM: MULTICULTURAL
GOVERNANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 56-58 (2009).
19
GERALD BEAUDOIN & DOROTHY DOBBIE, A RENEWED CANADA: THE REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
28 (1992).
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American” and overt Anglo-centrism contraposed against the
melting pot of the U.S. immigration policy was overlaid by a strict
hierarchy of preferred racial groups which sought to exclude
Blacks, Asians and other “races” due to cultural and racial
differences and because they were considered “unsuited” to the cold
Canadian climate. However, unable to compete with the U.S. and in
need of labour (particularly agricultural labour) to develop, Canada
expanded recruitment efforts to include immigrants from Eastern
Europe while tolerating immigration from Asia and other “nonwhite” areas. Nevertheless, the underlying justification of
“climatic” unsuitability continued to provide conceptual cover for
ideas of British/French racial and cultural superiority and reinforced
notions that these peoples were non-assimilable.20 These attitudes
were reflected in the law; for example, section 38 of the 1910
20

This attitude is evident in statements regarding Canada’s immigration policy
in the 1920s, see, e.g., Canada’s Immigration Policy, in CANADA YEAR BOOK
165-66 (1930) ("Immigration, which was at a low ebb during the war period, is
again increasing and becoming a chief means of reinforcing our population and
filling up the vast waste spaces of Canada. But where any considerable
immigration into a democratic country occurs, the racial and linguistic
composition of that immigration becomes of paramount importance. Canadians
generally prefer that settlers should be of a readily assimilable type, already
identified by race or language with one or the other of the two great races now
inhabiting this country and thus prepared for the assumption of the duties of
democratic Canadian citizenship. Since the French are not to any great extent an
emigrating people, this means in practice that the great bulk of the preferable
settlers are those who speak the English language - those coming from the U.K.
or the U.S. Next in order of readiness of assimilation are the Scandinavians and
the Dutch, who readily learn English and are already acquainted with the
workings of free democratic institutions. Settlers from Southern and Eastern
Europe, however desirable from a purely economic point of view, are less readily
assimilated, and the Canadianizing of the people from these regions who have
come to Canada in the present century is a problem both in the agricultural
Prairies Provinces and in the cities of the East. Less assimilable still, according to
the general opinion of Canadians, are those who come to Canada from the Orient.
On the whole the great bulk of Canadian immigration of the past generation has
been drawn from the English-speaking countries and from those Continental
European countries where the population is ethnically nearly related to the
British, though in recent years there has been an increasing immigra-tion of
Slavs.”).
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Canadian Immigration Act granted the Federal cabinet the power to
prohibit the entry “of immigrants belonging to any race deemed
unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada.”21 As such,
certain immigrants were required to pay exorbitant head taxes,
denied the franchise, or denied the opportunity to work in certain
industries or with white women.22 At the same time various groups,
such as the Chinese, were almost completely banned from
immigrating to Canada.23
Having increased difficulty justifying blatantly racial-based
exclusion policies, which might affect Canada’s international
reputation, immigration policy changed after the Second World
War. The federal government dramatically overhauled the
immigration system while simultaneously providing for Canadian
Citizenship in 1946. The 1952 Immigration Act,24 premised on the
idea immigration should meet the economic development needs and
family reunification objectives as well as provide for refugees,
nevertheless continued to exclude Asians who had no close
relatives already living in Canada, homosexuals, prostitutes, and
mentally disordered individuals.25 It also allowed for quotas on
South Asians.26 Nevertheless, the racialist and Anglo-centric
aspects of Canadian immigration policy were discarded by 1962.
After 1962 Canada implemented a points system, which
sought to address work and skills shortages and gave preferences to
certain classes of immigrants. The Immigration Act, 1976
21

An Act respecting Immigration, EARLY CANADIANA ONLINE (1910), available
at http://eco.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.9_07184#oocihm.9_07184/
15?r=0&s=1&_suid=1386665734839040821823483198094.
22
JAMES W.ST.G.WALKER, “RACE” RIGHTS AND THE LAW IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA: HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES, ch. 2(1997).
23
Lily Cho, Redress Revisited: Citizenship and the Chinese Canadian Head
Tax, in CANADA: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE CULTURE OF REDRESS 87-89
(Jennifer Henderson & Pauline Wakeham eds., 2013).
24
Canadian History; Immigration Voices at http://www.canadianhistory.ca/
iv/1945-1967/act/
25
Immigration Act 1952, s. 5 at Immigration Voices at http://www.
canadianhistory.ca/iv/1945-1967/textwindow/immigration_act_1952.html.
26
Canada in the Making, http://www.canadiana.ca/citm/specifique/
immigration_e.html.
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established three categories for potential immigrants: family class,
independent class, and humanitarian class.27 Family class
immigrants were given priority and were provided points for having
family members in Canada or were exempt from certain point
requirements.28 The generally more prosperous, entrepreneurial and
skilled independent immigrant class was awarded points based on
certain characteristics, which were indicative of certain economic
needs.29 The humanitarian class was those individuals whose
settlement was considered to be part of Canada’s humanitarian
obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees.30 At the same time, the cabinet was given considerable
latitude in easing entrance requirements for refugees, including the
creation of “displaced and persecuted” peoples’ categories that
would not be required to meet normal entrance requirements for
refugees. The Immigration Act, 1976 also gave more power to the
provinces to set their own immigration laws and expanded the list
of prohibited classes of individuals to include those who might be a
burden of social welfare or health services.31 Later changes in the
1980s and 1990s established a category for “business” immigrants
who could invest significant funds in the economy.32
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001
Twenty-first
century
developments
included
the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 (IRPA), which
currently sets forth the grounds and appeals protection from

27

Immigration Act 1975, ss. 7 & 114.
Alan Simmons, Immigration and Canada: Global and Transnational
Perspectives Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press Inc., 201) at 71-81.
29
Canadian history: Immigration Voices at http://www.canadianhistory.ca/
iv/1967-Present/overview2.html
30
Canada: Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Penny Becklumb,
(Canada’s Immigration Programme” BP-190E(2008) at 9-14; online:
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/bp190-e.pdf.
31
Id.
32
Id.
28
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deportation orders, exclusion orders and departure orders.33 The Act
provides for the consideration of humanitarian and compassionate
factors in light of all the circumstances of the case on appeal to the
Minister under section 25, with a right of judicial review in Federal
Court. The Minister is obligated to consider applications made by
foreign nationals who are located within Canada but is not obligated
to consider applications made by a foreign national located outside
of Canada. An appeal under section 25 may be based on
humanitarian considerations which take “into account the best
interests of a child directly affected” or where “sufficient
humanitarian and compassionate considerations warrant special
relief [from the removal order] in light of all the circumstances of
the case.”34
The procedure for a humanitarian and compassionate review
is divided into two assessment stages. The first assessment stage is
a request from an applicant for an exemption from certain
requirements under IRPA or any applicable regulations.35 The
burden of proof is upon the applicant to show that their individual
circumstances warrant an exemption.36 The second assessment
stage, which only occurs after a positive first assessment stage, is a
determination of whether the applicant will be provided permanent
residency.37 After an initial determination by an immigration
officer, an applicant may appeal a negative determination to the
Immigration Review Division under sections 63 and 65 of IPRA if
the “foreign national is a member of the family class and that their
sponsor is a sponsor within the meaning of the regulations.”38 Other
individuals who are not in the family class or a sponsor may appeal
33

Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227,c. 223
(Can.).
34
IRPA,c. 67(c)
35
IPRA, c. 25.
36
The applicant who “bears the burden of proving any claim upon which he
relies” Owusu v. MCI, 2004 FCA 38 at para. 5.
37
Canada: Citizenship and Immigration Canada: IP5 “Immigrant Applications in
Canada made on Humanitarian or Compassionate Grounds” Online: http://www
.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/ip/ip05-eng.pdf
38
IPRA c. 65.
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directly to the Federal Court under section 72.39 However, section
64 of the Act prohibits appeals from certain categories of
individuals: Those who have committed serious crimes (defined as
a term of imprisonment of at least six months or punishable by a
maximum term of at least ten years imprisonment), individuals who
have engaged in organized criminality, violated human or
international rights or may be a threat to national security and those
individuals who have engaged in misrepresentation (unless the
sponsored family member is the sponsor’s spouse, common-law
partner or child).40
The judicial appeals process concerns the adequacy of the
decisions applying the humanitarian and compassionate factors or
evaluating the Minister’s determination that certain classes of
applicants are excluded from a humanitarian and compassionate
appeal. For a determination of whether a ministerial determination
is valid, the standard of review for an appeal is reasonableness.41 A
correct decision under this standard is where there is “the existence
of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decisionmaking process” and “whether the decision falls within a range of
possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the
facts and law.”42 The criteria for determining a humanitarian and
compassionate appeal was outlined by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration).43 They include:
(1) The seriousness of the offense leading to the
removal order;
(2) The potential of rehabilitation;

39

IRPA, c. 72.(1) (stating, “Judicial review by the Federal Court with respect to
any matter — a decision, determination or order made, a measure taken or a
question raised — under this Act is commenced by making an application for
leave to the Court.”).
40
IPRA, c. 34, 35, 36 & 37.
41
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 45 (Can.).
42
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 47 (Can.).
43
Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R.
84 (Can.).
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(3) The length of time spent and the degree to which
the individual has resided in Canada;
(4) Family and community support available to the
person facing removal;
(5) The impact the removal would have on the
family in Canada (if any) and the dislocation to the
family that a removal would cause; and
(6) The degree of hardship that would be caused to
the removed individual in his country of
nationality.44
Other factors include health considerations and lack of
critically necessary healthcare and discrimination45 in the
applicant’s home country not covered by section 96 or section 97 of
IPRA.46 The Federal Court also noted that applicants must show
“unusual, underserved or disproportionate hardship” which must
personally affect the applicant in order to sustain a favourable
ruling under section 25.
In Berthoumieux v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)47 Roy, J. noted that allegations of “risks made in an
application for permanent residence on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds (H&C) must relate to a particular risk that is

44

Id. at paras. 40-41, 90.
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.R.
497, para. 26 (Can.) (citing Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989]
1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.) (describing discrimination as “a distinction which intentional
or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual
or group, has the effect of impos[ing] disadvantages not imposed upon others or
which withholds or limits access to advantages available to other members of
society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual
solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the charge of
discrimination, while those based on an individual's merits and capacities will
rarely be so classed.”).
46
IP 5: Immigrant Applications in Canada Made on Humanitarian or
Compassionate Grounds, CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, http://www.
cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/ip/ip05-eng.pdf.
47
Berthoumieux v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2013]
F.C. No. 1301 (Can.).
45
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personal to the applicant” [emphasis in original].48 As such,
generally poor conditions in the applicant’s home state, which
affect all individuals in the country do not in and of themselves
constitute hardship. An appeal is allowed if the decision being
appealed was wrong in law or fact, if there was a breach of a
principle of natural justice (for example, a breach to the right to be
heard), or if the court determines that the applicant has met the
burden of proof regarding the humanitarian and compassionate
considerations.
Individuals who are denied the opportunity to apply on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds because they fall within
an excluded category may also seek judicial review. IPRA prevents
those individuals who have engaged in organised criminality,
(section 37), the violation of human or international rights (section
35), and an act endangering national security (section 34), as
determined by the Minister, from using the humanitarian and
compassionate review process.49 The determination of who fits
within a particular category as well as the opportunity of the
exercise for ministerial discretion under these heads is also
reviewable by the courts. However, the burden upon those excluded
by ministerial decision is high and the exemption provisions cannot
include factors which might be considered humanitarian factors
under section 25.
This is evident in Agraira v. Canada, where the Supreme
Court gave wide discretion to the Minister in determining whether
an individual is a threat to national security and affirmed that
humanitarian and compassionate factors could not be used under
section 34(2) to obtain an exemption from exclusion based on
national security grounds.50 Agraira, a citizen of Libya was found to
be inadmissible on security grounds due to his membership in the
Libyan National Salvation Front, which had been classified as a
terrorist organization by Citizenship and Immigration Canada.51
48

Berthoumieux v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2013]
F.C. No. 1301 at para. 12. (Can.).
49
IPRA c. 34, 35, & 37.
50
Agraira v. Canada, [2013] S.C.R.36 (Can.).
51
Id. at para. 9.

253

NARROWING THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Vol. 35.2

Agraira argued that the ministerial discretion of rejecting his
application for an exemption under 34(2) as a national security risk
emphasized public safety and national security factors to the
exclusion of other relevant factors under section 34.52
The Court observing that the standard of review was
reasonableness and that considerable deference was to be accorded
the minister, noted that “a court reviewing the reasonableness of a
minister’s exercise of discretion is not entitled to engage in a new
weighing process.”53 As such, while the Court agreed that the term
“national interest” was broader than simply public security and
national defence, it declined to reverse the Ministerial decision as to
the finding of a security risk under section 34(1) and a
determination of an exemption under section 34(2).54 Moreover, the
Court noted that individual factors that may be relevant to a finding
that the individuals continued presence in Canada “is not
detrimental to the national interest,” cannot include humanitarian
and compassionate factors used under section 25.55 Thus for these
52

Section 34 of IRPA states:
34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security
grounds for
(a) engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a democratic
government, institution or process as they are understood in Canada;
(b) engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government;
(c) engaging in terrorism;
(d) being a danger to the security of Canada;
(e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety
of persons in Canada; or
(f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe
engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or
(c).
(2) The matters referred to in subsection (1) do not constitute inadmissibility in
respect of a permanent resident or a foreign national who satisfies the Minister
that their presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest.
IRPA, S.C. 2001, c.27. (Can.).
38
Id. at para. 91.

54

Id. at para. 65.
Id. at para. 84 (quoting “[B]ecause of the possibility of H&C relief under s. 25
of the IRPA, the principle of consistent expression dictates that H&C factors

55
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excluded individuals, personal or familial humanitarian or
compassionate considerations, which may be relevant to ascertain
how or why they may have acquired a proscribed membership,
engaged in or committed various acts or which could be relevant for
determination of their status, can never be considered. In effect,
proper status and identity are a condition precedent for the privilege
of the humanitarian and compassionate appeals.
The implication is that public safety and national security
are privileged considerations under IPRA and that Ministerial
discretion is accorded wider latitude in removal determinations
where humanitarian and compassionate factors may be relevant is
increasingly evident in Canadian removal and exclusion process.
IPRA has been amended over the years to expand ministerial
discretion and limit the scope of humanitarian appeals while
refocusing the immigration law more towards issues of security.
This was recognized by the Court in Medovarski v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).
The objectives as expressed in the IRPA indicate an
intent to prioritize security. . . . Viewed collectively,
the objectives of the IRPA and its provisions
concerning permanent residents, communicate a
strong desire to treat criminals and security threats
less leniently than under the former Act.56
The 2010 Balanced Refugee Reform Act amended IRPA to
restrict the right to appeal under section 25 and allowed the
Minister to place further restrictions on foreign nationals who have
been granted permanent residency on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds for public policy considerations.57 The Act
also added a new section [25(1.3)],58 which specifies that the
Minister may not consider factors taken into account during the

should not be relevant to a determination of what is in the national interest under
s. 34(2).”).
56
Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2
S.C.R. 539, para. 10 (Can.).
57
Balanced Refugee Reform Act S.C. 2010, c. 8.
58
IPRA, c. 25(1.3).
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refugee determination process when examining an application on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds made by a foreign
national, but requires the Minister to consider factors related to the
hardships that affect the foreign national applicant. As such, in any
application received after June 29, 2010 factors such as wellfounded fear of persecution, risk to life, and risk of cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment are not considered as part of the
humanitarian and compassionate grounds process. Rather, these
factors will be considered separately during the refugee protection
determination process. The effect of such changes is that the
applicant has a restricted factual basis upon which to make a section
25 application.
In 2012, the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act
amended IRPA to eliminate access to the Immigration Appeal
Division (IAD) for those permanent residents or family class
members who receive certain criminal sentences within Canada or
who are thought to have committed offences outside of Canada.59
The Act also expands Ministerial discretion to deny entry to
individuals on unspecified “public policy grounds”, increases the
penalty for misrepresentation from two to five years, entitles
Canadian Security Intelligence Service to conduct unrestricted,
compelled examinations of anyone making any application under
the Act, reduces already limited remedies for persons subject to
other findings of inadmissibility, and limits inadmissibility for
temporary entrants with inadmissible family members.60
The increased security emphasis, facilitated by the increased
deference the courts have taken toward ministerial decisions builds
on earlier jurisprudence, which limited the application of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter), particularly section 7 as
an infringement upon a security or liberty interest in removal
cases.61 Following Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick,62 the Canadian
59

Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, S.C. 2012, c. 17.
S.C. 2012, c. 17
61
Government of Canada, Constitution Act, 1982, JUSTICE LAWS WEBSITE,
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/page-15.html (“S. 7. Everyone has the
right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”)
60
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courts have applied a reasonableness standard of review for
Immigration Appeals Division decisions and have been deferential
to administrative decisions made by the Minister. This deference
has been justified by changes in the legislation, practical
considerations and separation of power considerations.63 Removal
decisions require “the application of broad policy considerations to
the facts as found to be relevant, and weigh for importance” and
whether there are sufficient humanitarian and compassionate
considerations to warrant relief from a removal order is “a decision
Parliament confided to the AID, not to the courts.”64 Moreover, as
pointed out by the Court in Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
v. Khosa, it extends “not only to facts and policy but to a tribunal’s
interpretation of its constitutive statute and related enactments,
because “there might be multiple valid interpretations of a statutory
provision or answers to a legal dispute and that courts ought not to
interfere where the tribunal’s decision is rationally supported.”65
The deference and policy consideration have extended to
constitutional analysis under section 7 of the Charter. This
jurisprudence has effectively limited the scope of section 7 to issues
of procedural substantive justice without any inquiry into the issue
of whether removal in and of itself violates a protected liberty
interest.66 The Court in Medovarski v. Canada per McLachlin, C.J.
(Unsucessful charter challenges have been made under s. 11(h) (right not to be
tried and punished for same offense twice), s. 12 (right not to be subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment), s. 15 (equal protection and benefit of the law) as
well as s. 7). See Daniela Bassan, The Canadian Charter and Public
International Law: Redefining the State’s Power to Deport Aliens, 34 Osgoode
Hall L. J. 3, 583, 595-600 (1996).
62
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190. (Court to
apply reasonableness standard “[w]here the question is one of fact, discretion or
policy, deference will usually apply automatically”) Dunsmuir at para. 53.
63
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Khosa, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339,para.
4 (Can.).
64
Id. at para. 4.
65
Id. at para. 25.
66
Chiarelli v. Canada, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, para. 27 (Can.) (Thus Parliament has
the right to adopt an immigration policy and to enact legislation prescribing the
conditions under which non-citizens will be permitted to enter and remain in
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observed that “[t]he most fundamental principle of immigration law
is that non-citizens do not have an unqualified right to enter or
remain in Canada.”67 The Court added: “Thus the deportation of a
non-citizen in itself cannot implicate the liberty and security
interests protected by s. 7.”68 As such, while the Court has found
that certification of security threats have offended procedural
fundamental justice under section 7,69 the Charter protections in
these cases are essentially procedural, and the underlying policy
impetus, reflected in the common law remains important. For
example, in Chiarelli v. Canada the court noted that in order to
determine “the scope of principles of fundamental justice” in
deportation cases as they might apply to the particular facts, “the

Canada. It has done so in the Immigration Act….The qualified nature of the
rights of non-citizens to enter and remain in Canada is made clear by s. 4 of the
Act… One of the conditions Parliament has imposed on a permanent resident's
right to remain in Canada is that he or she not be convicted of an offence for
which a term of imprisonment of five years or more may be imposed. This
condition represents a legitimate, non-arbitrary choice by Parliament of a
situation in which it is not in the public interest to allow a non-citizen to remain
in the country. The requirement that the offence be subject to a term of
imprisonment of five years indicates Parliament's intention to limit this condition
to more serious types of offences. It is true that the personal circumstances of
individuals who breach this condition may vary widely…. However there is one
element common to all persons who fall within the class of permanent residents
described in s. 27(1)(d)(ii). They have all deliberately violated an essential
condition under which they were permitted to remain in Canada. In such a
situation, there is no breach of fundamental justice in giving practical effect to the
termination of their right to remain in Canada. In the case of a permanent
resident, deportation is the only way in which to accomplish this. There is
nothing inherently unjust about a mandatory order. The fact of a deliberate
violation of the condition imposed by s. 27(1)(d)(ii) is sufficient to justify a
deportation order. It is not necessary, in order to comply with fundamental
justice, to look beyond this fact to other aggravating or mitigating circumstances).
67
Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2
S.C.R. 539, paras. 10, 46 (Can.) para. 46.
68
Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2
S.C.R. 539, paras.10, 46 (Can.) (emphasis added).
69
Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1
S.C.R. 350 (Can.).
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court must look to the principles and policies underlying
immigration law.”70

III. NEW ZEALAND
A Brief Overview of New Zealand’s Immigration
Policy 71
The Economist has recently ranked New Zealand as the fifth
most democratic State in its annual democracy index.72 Human
rights and civil liberties are supported by statutory and common law
protections such as the Human Rights Act 1993, judicial review of
executive action, natural justice and international human rights
conventions. New Zealand’s Human Rights Act 1993 is designed to
protect fundamental human rights “in general accordance with
United Nations Covenants or Conventions on Human Rights” and
has been accorded “special status” by the courts.73 The courts have
recognized that such human rights guarantees shall guide the
determinations of New Zealand’s many statutory tribunals,
including the Immigration and Protection Tribunal (IPT) and
potentially any decision of a public nature.74 New Zealand courts
have also held that international treaty obligations and principles of
customary public international law impose extra-legal restraints.75

70

Chiarelli v. Canada (Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711,
para. 734 (Can.).
71
See Fadgen and Charlton, 2012(43) VUWLR.
72
Democracy index 2012 Democracy at a Standstill: A Report from The
Economist Intelligence Unit, THE ECONOMIST (2013), available at
https://portoncv.gov.cv/dhub/porton.por_global.open_file?p_doc_id=1034.
73
Dir. of Human Rights Proceedings v N.Z. Thoroughbred Racing Inc. [2002] 3
NZLR 333 (CA) 339 Elias CJ for the Court.
74
Royal Australasian Coll. of Surgeons v Phipps [1999] 3 NZLR 1 (CA);
O'Leary v Health Funding Auth. [2001] NZAR 717 (HC).
75
See e.g. Puli'uvea v Removal Review Auth. (1996) 14 FRNZ 322 (CA) 331
(finding courts will courts will "strive to interpret legislation consistently with the
treaty obligations of New Zealand."); N.Z. Airline Pilots Ass’n Inc. v AttorneyGeneral [1997] 3 NZLR 269 (CA) 289 (finding such obligations are viewed
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These general human rights principles have not, however,
always enjoyed such an expansive application within the
immigration context. The common law has recognised this broad
power. As noted by Cooke J, “[i]mmigration is a subject linked
with foreign policy [and] . . . [i]n that sense it falls within a sphere
where the Courts are very slow to intervene.”76 International norms
and institutions have also had an effect, but domestic politics and
liberal democratic norms as articulated within the domestic polity
have had the paramount impact on national migration control policy
and law.77 As such, the decisional efficacy of humanitarian
considerations on administrative and judicial decision-making,
while informed by international law, generally remains wedded to
domestic conceptions of what is “humanitarian.”
New Zealand, settled by a predominately British population,
developed a migration policy dominated by economic, and to a
lesser extent racial and social, considerations. After World War II
the Government accepted the recommendation of the Dominion
Population Commission that immigration (including government
sponsored immigration from the United Kingdom and Northern
Europe) could be used to fill jobs in secondary and tertiary
industries that could not be staffed by the current workforce.78 In
1960 additional changes were made to staff essential industries. The
economic arguments in favour of increased immigration often
clashed with the widely subscribed notion that New Zealand wished
to remain “British” and “non-Asian”.79 From 1920 onward this
policy provided that all individuals who were not “of British birth

"whether or not the legislation was enacted with the purpose of implementing the
relevant text.").
76
Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222 (CA) 226 Cooke J for
the Court.
77
Virginie Guiraudon & Gallya Lahav, A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty
Debate: The Case of Migration Control, 33 Comp. Pol. Stud. 163, 164 (2000).
78
Dominion Population Committee: Report of the Dominion Population
Committee, AUSTL. J. OF HUMAN RIGHTS17, 21–22 (1946).
79
MALCOLM MCKINNON, IMMIGRANTS AND CITIZENS: NEW ZEALANDERS AND
ASIAN IMMIGRATION IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 36-43 (1996).
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or parentage” were required to have an “entry permit.”80 Under the
system permits were difficult to attain for non-British Europeans
but were “virtually unattainable by non-Europeans” except in the
uncommon instance where the Minister decreed that a certain
number be issued.81 Where there were exceptions to the nonEuropean policy it was usually in favour of Pacific Islanders, the
great majority of whom came from New Zealand-controlled
territories. This racially discriminatory system was reaffirmed in the
Immigration Act of 1964.82 The racial bias in the migration law did
not escape notice from other States and was increasingly viewed by
the public as antithetical to New Zealand’s international obligations
and liberal values. In 1987 the Government eliminated the last
official vestiges of the implicit “White New Zealand” immigration
policy by removing the preferences given to “traditional source
countries” of Great Britain, Northern Europe and North America.83
New Zealand’s current immigration policy consists of three main
categories: economic migrants (those individuals who have certain
skills, occupations, entrepreneurial or business capacities), migrants
who are admitted under family reunification rules and those
admitted on humanitarian grounds.
While domestic considerations remain paramount in
migration policies and law, international norms and obligations
have been increasingly influential since World War II. As
mentioned above New Zealand generally restricted entry to persons
of British or Irish parentage prior to World War II, but after the War
international norms concerning the plight of displaced persons and
refugees (due to the egregious human rights violations during the
fighting and the Holocaust) became increasingly salient.
Humanitarian considerations started to be considered alongside

80

Sean Brawley, No 'White Policy' in NZ: Fact and Fiction in New Zealand's
Asian Immigration Record, 1946–1978, 27 N.Z. J. OF HIST. 16, 19 (1993).
81
Id.
82
Kerry Burke, Review of Immigration Policy, August 1986, AUSTL. J. OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 42 (1986).
83
The Immigration Act 1987 (NZ).

261

NARROWING THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Vol. 35.2

economic and country of origin criteria.84 Initially, these
humanitarian considerations focused on refugees displaced by the
conflict in Europe. After the War, the Government accepted 4,582
displaced European refugees as well as displaced persons who
arrived on International Refugee Organisation ships.85 In 1956 it
agreed to a quota of 1,000 (later increased to 1,300) Hungarian
refugees following the aborted anti-communist revolution.86 Section
40 of the Immigration Act 1964 reinforced the growing
humanitarian element in migration decisions in statute when it
stated: “Nothing in this Act shall affect the prerogative of mercy.”
This led to the practice where individuals who were subject to
deportation would petition the Governor-General for a pardon,
removing the underlying conviction that led to the deportation
order.87
As part of this general move toward including international
legal considerations in migration decisions, New Zealand ratified
the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in 1960, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination in 1972, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1978 and the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC) in
1993.88 These international obligations extended human rights and
84

YOUCEF BOUANDEL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS (1997);
Thomas Buergenthal, The Normative and Institutional Evolution of International
Human Rights, 19 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 703 (1997).
85
New Zealand Parliament "Immigration chronology: selected events 18402008" (Apr. 14, 2008) Parliamentary support: Research papers
<www.parliament.nz>.
86
Id.
87
K.J. Keith, Administrative Law Developments in New Zealand as Seen
Through Immigration Law, in INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CANADIAN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DAVID MULLAN, 125, 128 (Huscroft & Michael
Taggart eds., 2006).
88
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (opened for
signature 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954); International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 660
U.N.T.S. 195 (opened for signature 21 December 1965, entered into force 4
January 1969); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
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non-discriminatory protections to those seeking to enter the country
when they had a well-founded fear of persecution, and provided
that the appropriate due process and humanitarian considerations be
accorded individuals gaining access to or being removed from New
Zealand, regardless of the applicants’ irremediable characteristics.
These international obligations are embedded in the
Immigration Act 2009. The Act specifically incorporates New
Zealand’s international obligations under the United Nations
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); which now
includes the category of “protected person” alongside “refugee” in
the determination of deportation liability.89 The international legal
instruments include protections for those individuals who can
establish “substantial grounds for believing that [they] would be in
danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel
treatment if deported from New Zealand.”90 Consideration of both
the substantive and procedural requirements of these instruments is
mandatory when determining the validity of a migrant’s claims to
be a refugee or a protected person as well as in the deportation of
such persons.91 Moreover, the Act permits a deportation order
quashed where an individual can demonstrate personal
circumstances covered by “relevant” international obligations.92
As international law was being reconceptualised from a
body concerned with the rights of States inter se to one where
individuals are recognised as having certain rights, there were
parallel domestic developments in the law regarding the rights of
immigrants and aliens. Prior to 1980 “aliens” had no right to be in
the country except by approval of the Crown; there were few if any
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (opened for signature 19 December 1966, entered into force 3
January 1976) [ICESCR]; United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (opened for signature 20 November 1989, entered into force 2
September 1990) [UNCROC].
89
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ss. 129–131
90
Immigration Act 2009, c. 131(1).
91
Id., at s. 164.
92
Id., at s. 177.
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protections for revocations of permits and immediate removal for
aliens who did not have permission to be in the country. For
example, the Court in Pagliara v. Attorney-General, which
considered the issue of whether an alien who had been convicted of
a crime would be entitled to a hearing concerning his deportation,
noted (quoting Lord Denning):
But in the case of aliens, it is rather different; for
they have no right to be here except by licence of the
Crown. And it has been held that the Home
Secretary is not bound to hear representations on
their behalf, even in the case of a deportation order,
though, in practice, he usually does so.93
After 1980 the courts gradually extended procedural
protections to migrants. In Daganayasi v. Minister of Immigration
the Court held that a decision by the Minister to deport Daganayasi
was invalid because the Minister had not allowed the appellant a
chance to see or respond to a medical report which created an
incorrect impression that there would be little risk to the appellant’s
child should he be forced to leave New Zealand with his parents.94
This case signaled a fundamental shift in attitudes towards
migrants. The general trend toward greater procedural protections
was encouraged by the Bill of Rights Act 1990, which affirms the
right of every person “to the observance of the principles of natural
justice” in any administrative decision.95 The section was extended
to the migration context when the Crown accepted that the section
27 natural justice provisions applied to migrants in AttorneyGeneral v. Udompun.96 Subsequently the court of appeal extended
the procedural rights accorded to potential deportees’ citizen
children who would be affected by a deportation order.97 These
considerations include addressing the fact that a citizen child’s
93

Pagliara v Attorney-General [1974] 1 NZLR 86 (SC) 94 (quoting Schmidt v
Secretary of State [1969] 1 All ER 904 (CA) 908–909).
94
Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration [1980] 2 NZLR 130 (CA).
95
Bill of Rights Act (1990) (NZ) at s. 27(1)(a).
96
Attorney-General v Udompun [2005] 3 NZLR 204 (CA).
97
Ye v Minister of Immigration [2008] NZCA 291, [2009] 2 NZLR 596; Huang
v Minister of Immigration [2008] NZCA 377, [2009] 2 NZLR 700.
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different status in his or her parents’ home country may adversely
impact or subject them to discrimination.98
Deportation in New Zealand Law
Deportation orders are issued under Part 6 of the
Immigration Act 2009 by the Minister of Immigration or GovernorGeneral when a non-citizen threatens national security or is
convicted of certain criminal offences. The deportation provisions
were designed in light of the Act’s overall objective to “better
balance efficiency with fairness”99 in immigration matters and to
“manage immigration in a way that balances the national interest, as
determined by the Crown, and the rights of individuals,”100 while
“implementing specified-related international obligations.”101
Under the Act an aggrieved party may appeal to the
Immigration Protection Tribunal (IPT) on a question of fact under
section 201 or on humanitarian grounds under section 206. A
person must file a humanitarian claim within the relevant time
period specified by the Act, (which depends upon the liable
deportee’s immigration status) and may not file an appeal where the
individual has already “had a humanitarian appeal heard by the
Tribunal in relation to a claim or a subsequent claim.”102 The
grounds used by the IPT to evaluate a humanitarian appeal are set
out in section 207 of the Act. The appeal must be allowed and the
deportation order quashed if the IPT is satisfied that “there are
exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would
make it unjust or unduly harsh” for the appellant to be deported
from New Zealand and “it would not in all the circumstances be
contrary to the public interest to allow” the individual to remain in

98

Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104 at [60]–
[61].
99
Immigration Act 2009: Summary of Key Changes I MMIGRATION NEW
ZEALAND (Dec. 2010), www.immigration.govt.nz.
100
Immigration Act 2009, c. 3 (N.Z.).
101
Immigration Act 2009, supra note 90.
102
Immigration Act 2009, c. 206(3)(b) (N.Z.).
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New Zealand.103 The appellant, while not carrying the burden of
proof [contrary to the situation in Canada], has the responsibility to
place material before the IPT which, if accepted, would allow the
order to be quashed.104
Doug Tennent, a lecturer at the University of Waikato,
noted that the section 207 “unjust or unduly harsh” balancing test
was the “highest of all thresholds” used in humanitarian appeals
under the Immigration Act 1987, and it is clear that the test is a high
bar to a successful humanitarian appeal.105 Generally, the “unjust”
portion of the test refers to the unfairness and the negative impact
the requirement to leave would have on the person given the time
the person has spent in New Zealand and the commitment the
individual (work, social intercourse, wealth generation activities)
has shown to the country. The “unduly harsh” aspect of the test
refers to the impact deportation would have on family members and
on those to whom the liable deportees are emotionally close.
The determination of these factual issues is complicated by
several additional factors. First, precisely what qualifies as a
“humanitarian” ground is not defined in the Act nor fully elucidated
in case law. It is clear that the suffering and dangers to life which
led to the enactment of the Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, and the CAT, are “humanitarian” issues, as are such
circumstances as the effects of family separation for families and
children who have some members who have the right to stay in
New Zealand. In addition, circumstances such as the existence of
physical or mental infirmity, mental illness, where a person would
be prejudiced or otherwise adversely affected by his or her race,
ethnic origin, religion, nationality, sex or other status, or for their
political opinions, or for an offence of a political character, may be
considered.106
These factors are not in themselves determinative but the
material nature of a “humanitarian” factor in the test is dependent
103
104
105
106

Id. c. 207.
Faavae v Minister of Immigration [2000] NZAR 177 (CA).
DOUGLAS TENNENT, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW 290 (2010).
Bujak v The Minister of Justice [2009] NZCA 570 (SC).
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upon the individual circumstances and the context.107 However,
where the impact on a potential deportee goes beyond the relatively
narrow compass of a “well-founded” fear of physical harm or
persecution, the humanitarian nature of a particular factor or status
within a particular context is difficult to ascertain, and can often be
an issue of semantics rather than legal standards or principles. As
noted by Tipping J. in Ye v. Minister of Immigration:
Article 3(1) [of the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child] provides that in all actions
concerning children, by public and administrative
authorities, the best interests of the child shall be “a
primary consideration”. A primary consideration
does not mean the primary consideration, much less
the paramount consideration. There is no basis for
reading in, as the appellants argued, the Care of
Children Act 2004 standard of “first and paramount
consideration”. That would not be consistent with
the policy objectives which must be reconciled in
cases of the present kind. . . . The Care of Children
Act is not concerned with immigration matters in
respect of which the Immigration Act states the
relevant policies.108
Second, these humanitarian grounds must be of an
“exceptional” nature. As such, the usual impacts of physical and
mental health, and those suffered by families who have members
who are subject to deportation cannot be humanitarian “concerns”
which the test may consider to allow for a successful appeal. As the
Supreme Court has observed:
The need for the circumstances of the case to be
exceptional means that those circumstances must be
well outside the normal run of circumstances found
107

Minister of Immigration v Al-Hosan [2008] NZCA 462, [2009] NZAR 259
(HC).
108
Ye v Minister of Immigration [2008] NCZA 291, [2009] 2 NZLR 596 at [24];
see also Tipping J. Puli'uvea v Removal Review Authority [1996] 14 FRNZ 332
(CA).
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in overstayer cases generally. The circumstances do
not have to be unique or very rare but they do have
to be truly an exception rather than the rule.109
The high and relatively amorphous standard under section
207 of the Immigration Act 2009 is a significant change from the
1987 Act. In addition to the “unjust or unduly harsh” evaluation, the
1987 Act outlined a set of criteria to assist the appeals tribunal and
the courts in determining the quality and scope of the humanitarian
concerns of the deportee.110 These factors did not preclude the
Tribunal from considering other factors but gave a structure to the
inquiry while setting a minimum standard for judicial review.111
Sections 22 and 105 of the Immigration Act 1987, while using the
same “unjust or unduly harsh” test carried over into the 2009 Act,
but the set of criteria established in section 22(6) by the 1987 Act
was not in the subsequent legislation. Hence, in place of the sevenprong requirements of inquiry under the Immigration Act 1987, the
2009 Act merely requires a balance of the individual interest
(exceptional humanitarian concerns resulting in an injustice or
unduly harsh outcome beyond mere repatriation but not to the level
of those faced by a refugee or protected person) and the
community’s interest, to permit the individual’s continued presence

109

Ye v Minister of Immigration [2008] NZCA 29, [2009] 2 NZLR 596 at [34]
(footnote omitted).
110
Immigration Act 1987 (N.Z.), c. 22.6. These factors include:
(a) the appellant's age;
(b) the length of the period during which the appellant has been in New Zealand
lawfully;
(c) the appellant's personal and domestic circumstances;
(d) the appellant's work record;
(e) the nature of the offence or offences of which the appellant has been
convicted and from which the liability for deportation arose;
(f) the nature of any other offences of which the appellant has been convicted;
(g) the interests of the appellant's family; and
(h) such other matters as the Tribunal considers relevant (see s 2).
111
See generally Al-Hosan v Deportation Review Tribunal [2007] HC Auckland
CIV 2006-404-3923; Minister of Immigration v Al-Hosan,[2008] NZCA 462,
[2009] NZAR 259 (HC).
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in New Zealand.112 The community interest can be understood as
the public interest in the deportation of the individual given the
seriousness of the conviction and the likelihood of reoffending (for
example, issues of social cohesion, public confidence, deterrence
and repugnance of the public to the particular offence).
Despite the narrow scope necessitated by section 207 in the
humanitarian appeal and the deportation process, there are
international obligations, which can inform both the admission and
removal of individuals in the appeals process under the Act. The
Act specifically incorporates New Zealand’s international
obligations under both the CAT and the ICCPR while enacting the
international law category of “protected person” alongside the
previously enacted category of “refugee.” In addition, the Act
consistently makes reference to “international obligations” which
should be considered by immigration officials when making
determinations on deportation orders. Section 177, which allows for
a deportation order to be quashed, specifically mentions
“international obligations.” Under the section, an immigration
officer may cancel a deportation order at his or her “absolute
discretion” where a “person provides information to the officer
concerning his or her personal circumstances” and “the information
is relevant to New Zealand’s international obligations.”113 While
there is no right of appeal under this section, nor is the officer
required to act on any information offered, the officer must, if
exercising his or her discretion to cancel an order “have regard to
any [relevant] international obligations”, whether the consideration
is at the prospective deportee’s behest or not.114 The officer is not
bound to issue any written justification for a decision under section
177(4)(a), but is “obliged to record [. . . .] a description of the
international obligations; and [. . . .] the facts about the person’s
personal circumstances” wherever the officer has “regard to any
international obligations”.115 Presumably, the record or summation
112
113
114
115

Immigration Act 2009 at s. 207.
Immigration Act 2009 (N.Z.), ss 177(1), 177 (2).
Id. at ss. 177; 175(5),
Id. at 175(5).
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made at this juncture is carried forward in any later appeal of the
deportation order. It does however raise the spectre of more
informed or knowledgeable officers taking a greater proactive
approach in applying “international obligations” to individuals
presenting relevant grounds for official consideration.
In addition to the explicit international obligations
mentioned in the Act, the courts have in certain instances read in
other international obligations created by the Government. First, the
courts, where not explicitly precluded from doing so, “should strive
to interpret legislation consistently with the treaty obligations of
New Zealand.”116 Second, where the treaty obligation has not yet
been incorporated into statute but where the principles and rules
reflect fundamental common law values and the rights outlined in
the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) the courts will apply a
presumption of consistency.117 In Zaoui v. Attorney-General (No 2)
the Supreme Court held that the presumption of consistency in
favour of international obligations provided for certain substantive
and procedural requirements within the context of the Immigration
Act 1987.118 Nevertheless, the extent to which courts are to include
international norms or interpret statutes consistently with
international obligations – particularly those international
obligations which have not been directly incorporated into domestic
law – remains largely unresolved. However, the issue highlights the
differential impacts of diverse interpretive approaches where courts
are seeking to reasonably balance the protected rights in light of
subsequent statutory language infringing upon those rights.
After a determination of deportation liability there may be
an appeal to the courts. The judicial review authority in
immigration cases exists regardless of the extent of the
discretionary power the executive branch exercises in a particular
decision. There are two types of review: an appeal on a point of law
116

Puli'uvea v Removal Review Auth. [1996] 14 FRNZ 322 (CA). See also
Puli'uvea v Removal Review Auth.[1996] 3 NZLR 538 (CA) 542.
117
Michael Taggart, Rugby, The Anti-apartheid Movement, and Administrative
Law, in PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION: THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 82 (Rick Bigwood ed., 2006).
118
Zaoui v Attorney-General (No 2) [2005] 1 NZLR 577 (SC).
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and judicial review. An appeal on a point of law argues that the
substantive and procedural law relating to the case have been
incorrectly interpreted or applied. Judicial review concerns whether
the decision has been reached in a manner that is in accordance with
the law in a fair and reasonable manner.119
Prior to the passage of the 2009 Act the scope of review was
limited. However the incorporation of international obligations, the
congruence of many substantive and procedural rights claimed in
migration proceedings with fundamental common law rights, and
rights guaranteed by the NZBORA had seemingly pushed the courts
to observe a more assertive stance and exacting standard of review.
For example, Baragwanath J. in Ding v. Minister of Immigration
119

Wolf v Minister of Immigration (2004) HRNZ 469 (HC); TENNENT , supra
note 105, at 296. "A hard-look approach or heightened level of intensity of
review is appropriate, but even on a Wednesbury analysis the immigration officer
acted unreasonably and irrationally": Bugdaycay v Sec’y of State for the Home
Dep’t [1987] 1 AC 514 (HL) 531 per Bridge LJ; R (Mahmood) v Sec’y of State
for the Home Dep’t [2001] 1 WLR 840 (CA) 18; Pharm. Mgmt. Agency Ltd. v
Roussel Uclaf Austl. Pty Ltd.[1998] NZAR 58 (CA) 66; Discount Brands Ltd v
Westfield (New Zealand) Ltd [2005] NZSC 17, [2005] 2 NZLR 597 at [54] per
Keith J and 116per Blanchard J (with Richardson J agreeing at 179; R (Daly) v
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2001] 2 AC 532; and R v Ministry of Defence,
ex p Smith [1996] QB 517 (CA) 554 per Thomas Bingham MR. The level of
intensity depends upon the nature of the right being interfered with: the more
fundamental the right the higher the intensity of review. The right at issue here is
the right of a child to be looked after by its natural parents, which is an important
right even if not protected by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act [NZBORA].
The NZBORA is not an exhaustive statement of rights (s 28). Article 3(1) of the
UNCROC and arts 17, 23 and 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights [ICCPR] place the rights and interests of a child as rights and
interests of the highest order. The circumstances of this case, which involve the
separation of children (who are New Zealand citizens) from their parent and
guardian, call for "anxious scrutiny" and the highest intensity of review. Intensity
of review of the ss 54 and/or 58 decisions depends upon the whole context (R
(Daly) v Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2001] UKHL 26 at 548). The whole
context includes the best interests of the children who are either about to be
removed from their country of citizenship or who are about to have their mother
removed from them. The context is not limited by the existence and language of s
47(3) of the Immigration Act 1987. Ye v Minister of Immigration, [2008] NZCA
291 at [111–112].
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advocated a higher level of scrutiny in those immigration cases
where a child might be adversely affected:
The Crown is right in its argument that the state
interest in immigration control means that it is an
area in which courts traditionally show great
deference to the policy of the Executive. But to
maintain in cases of risk to a citizen child a bare
Wednesbury standard of whether the decision-maker
took that consideration into account but without
awareness of the consequences to the child of an
adverse decision, however appropriate for a child
who is an alien, is difficult to reconcile with the
concurrent Crown obligation of protection of the
citizen child. To accept such low level intensity of
review is equally difficult to square with the Courts’
parens patriae role in relation to citizen children.120
However, the elimination of the humanitarian tests in
sections 105 and 22 of the 1987 Act as well as the procedure set out
in section 171 to quash a deportation order has re-entrenched a
more limited standard of review and has potentially severely
circumscribed the ability of the courts to review migration
decisions, particularly in light of humanitarian and human rights
issues. The effects of these changes, particularly the elimination of
the seven-pronged humanitarian test in the 2009 Act, are evident in
the recent decision by Lang J. in Babulal v Chief Executive
Department of Labour.121 Lang J. notes that a low Wednesbury
standard of review is not new in immigration cases122 and observes
that section 177 was enacted “as a direct legislative response to [. .
120

Ding v Minister of Immigration (2006) 25 FRNZ 568 (HC) 260. See also
TENNENT, supra note 105, at 298–301.
121
Yatish Suresh Babulal v. Chief Exec. Dep’t of Labour CIV-2011-404-1773.
122
Id. at 37. See also Huang v Minister of Immigration, above n 27, at [67] per
William Young J:
“… the Court should ensure that the best interests of an affected child were
genuinely taken into account as a primary consideration but, beyond that, how
conflicting considerations are weighted is for the decision maker and not the
court unless unreasonableness considerations can be successfully invoked.
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..]Ye [. . ..] and Huang” and stands for the proposition that an
immigration officer is no longer under any obligation “to have
regard to the humanitarian grounds” set forth in section 207.123
Lang J. continues to hold that the highly deferential
Wednesbury reasonableness standard is a sufficient standard of
review and explicitly rejects Babulal’s request that the Court
employ the “hard look” approach due to the probable “severe
impact [. . ..] [on] Babulal’s daughters.”124 First, Lang J. rejects the
“hard look” argument because the wording of section 177 gives
expansive discretion to the executive. He notes that there is no right
to apply for a cancellation order and “no obligation to have regard
to the humanitarian grounds”125 when making a decision (or nondecision) under the section. Further, the immigration officer is
under no obligation to provide reasons for not cancelling a
deportation order unless the officer “has had regard to New
Zealand’s international obligations.”126 However rather than a
detailed explanation and analysis of a section 177 decision, this
requirement, in Lang J’s view, simply calls for “description of the
[international] obligations” and a recording of “facts about the
personal circumstances of the person subject to the order.”127 There
is no “obligation to give reasons for his or her decision.”128 Second,
the procedure requires that the officer supply a restricted amount of
information relating only to the relevant international obligations
when making a record of the decision. This restricted information
enables only the barest Wednesbury scrutiny:
[W]here an immigration officer makes a decision
that requires him or her to have regard to New
Zealand’s international obligations, Parliament
intended the record of the decision to contain
sufficient information to allow the decision to be
judicially reviewed within a very narrow compass. It
123
124
125
126
127
128

Yatish Suresh Babulal, CIV-2011-202-1733 at 20.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 20 & 28.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 33.
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accepted that the court must have sufficient
information to be able to determine whether the
immigration officer who made the decision took into
account the international obligations relevant to the
particular case. The requirement to record the facts
relating to the personal circumstances of the person
subject to the deportation order also provides the
court with the ability to determine whether the
ultimate decision was reasonable in a Wednesbury
sense, but no more than that.129
Third, the failure to mention particular “international
obligations” that an officer must have regard to when choosing not
to quash the order, as well as the elimination of any humanitarian
requirement and seven-pronged test in the new statute, limits the
ability of the court to undertake a “hard look” review of the
decision for material errors of law because there is little law or facts
“there” to review. Lang J. acknowledges that an attempt to totally
fetter judicial review of an administrative decision must be read
down, but that in this case “judicial review [.. . .] [is] based on an
alleged failure by an immigration officer to have regard to New
Zealand’s international obligations when reaching his or her
decision.”130 However, the salient aspect of the statute is the
absence of statutory language that might provide for stricter
scrutiny:
The absence of any requirement to give reasons tells
against an expectation by Parliament that the
decision will be subject to close scrutiny by the
courts, because a lack of reasons will virtually
inevitably compromise such an undertaking. As a
result, even if the court wished to take a “hard” or
“anxious” look at such a decision, it would struggle
do so.131

129
130
131

Yatish Suresh Babulal, CIV-2011-202-1733 at 36.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
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The upshot of this is that judicial review of a decision under
section 177 is necessarily minimal, regardless of the humanitarian
or international obligations arguments put forward. Since
Parliament chose not to require a specific justification under section
177, Lang J. held that there was little necessary documentation to
review the decision.132 For Lang J., the standard immigration
officer’s consideration record need amount to little more than a
docket list of documents containing humanitarian concerns and an
incongruous index to “international obligations” to which the
official has had regard, concluding with a note that the officer is
“not obliged to provide reasons” for his decision upholding the
deportation order.133 Likewise the Court is not required to scrutinise
the list when it looks, on balance, to be in order. As a result,
Babulal’s deportation is reasonable and his appeal dismissed.
This raises a major problem, because the Court’s supposed
knowledge, comes without a record and without resorting to a “hard
look” analysis. Moreover, the relevant obligations are unlikely
reasonably interpreted when there is only a (non-exclusive)
summary of the factors used in the decision. In effect, the
Wednesbury standard under the circumstances leaves little, if any,
room for the court to review the efficacy of international obligations
in the particular circumstances. The test, as set forth in Babulal
simply requires an executive listing of some international
obligations and personal circumstances. There is no judicial inquiry,
(nor can there be given the paucity of information), into whether or
how the obligations or personal circumstances were considered.
The resultant decision will always be “reasonable” under
Wednesbury since the ultimate test is the mere balancing of
probabilities between the public interest in permitting the proposed
deportee to remain and the international obligations or humanitarian
factors under consideration.

132
133

Id. at ¶ 35.
Immigration Act 2009 s. 177 3(b)(1).
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IV. UNITED STATES:
Overview of U.S. Immigration and Removal Policy
A common approach to the study of U.S. immigration is to
view the development of the immigration system into four historical
periods.134 The first period, from 1789-1874 was a period of
relatively unrestricted entry to the U.S. and limited grounds for
deportation. The second period, from 1875-1917, was marked by
both tighter controls on who could legally enter the U.S. as well as
an expansion of grounds for expulsion. There were also two
important attributes to this second period: a sharp rise in
immigration to the U.S. and a shift from state-based immigration
policies to Federal supremacy.135 An even more rigorously
controlled immigration context emerged during World War I and
later with the Red Scare (and Palmer Raids) in 1919-1920. This
period also witnessed the creation of the U.S. Border Patrol in
1924.136 These controls were lessened, however, between 1941 and
1980, largely in response to the displacement of individuals during
the Second World War and the following Cold War. A restrictive
turn in immigration policy re-emerged with the election of Ronald
Reagan as U.S. president in 1980. After several years of
congressional bargaining over immigration law reforms, the
Immigration Reform and Control Act 1986 (IRCA) was adopted.
Among other things, the law sought both to provide sanctions to
employers knowingly employing undocumented workers, largely
from Mexico, and move towards legalizing many undocumented
workers.
The power to remove or deport aliens has a long history in
the U. S. Generally the classes of those considered “undesirable”
has grown more numerous. Along with these developments, a set of
regulatory and legal standards have arisen, which accords a large
134

DAVID M. HEER, IMMIGRATION IN AMERICA’S FUTURE: SOCIAL SCIENCE
FINDINGS AND THE POLICY DEBATE (1996).
135
See also MOLONEY, supra note 6, at 25.
136
HEER, supra note 134, at 47.
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amount of executive discretion to oversee the immigration system.
Bill Hing, a professor at the University of San Francisco, notes that
the first federal power to deport aliens from the U.S. (though never
used) was found in the Alien Friends Act (1798), which was part of
the Alien and Sedition Laws.137
The power to deport, albeit one appearing again in narrow
form, would not appear again until 1888. By 1891, however,
deportation authority was back to stay. The Immigration Act 1891
permitted the exclusion and/or deportation of many ‘undesirables’
(prostitutes, certain criminals, the mentally ill, polygamists, those
likely to become public charges, those suffering from certain
diseases and Chinese labourers).138 By 1903 the statute included
two additional lines of limitation for immigrants: (1) the statute of
limitations was increased from one to three years from date of entry
(except in the case of public charges, who were held to a two-year
standard); and (2) the statute expanded the class of inadmissible
aliens to include epileptics, those who suffered insanity within five
years of entry or those having had more than one episode of
insanity over the course of their lives, beggars, anarchists and
importers of prostitutes.139 Additional restrictions were added a few
years later when Congress added ‘imbeciles’, the ‘feeble-minded’,
those with tuberculosis, unaccompanied children suspected of moral
turpitude, immoral woman and those with physical or mental defect
that might limit ability to work in 1907.140
A decade later, in 1917, in the wake of anarchist disruptions,
the World War in Europe and on the eve of the Red Scare,
‘illiterates’, those of ‘constitutional psychopathic inferiority’,
alcoholics, those who had suffered more than one episode of
‘insanity’, Hindus and other ‘Asiatics’ were also forbidden.141 In
addition the 1917 Act established a five-year statute of limitations
on deportations for those found violating the Immigration Act.
137

BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 209
(2004).
138
Id.at 210.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Immigration Act 1917.
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However, aliens sentenced to a year’s imprisonment for a crime
involving moral turpitude, those advancing the overthrow of
government by force and violence, and those practicing or
connected with prostitution were deportable irrespective of their
length of residence.142 In 1918 and 1920 Congress authorized the
exclusion and expulsion of anarchists including those individuals
possessing explosives (even if evidence of anarchist activity could
not be established) and in 1922 narcotic offenders were added to the
list. In 1924, those overstaying their visas, regardless of family ties,
length of stay or other mitigating factors, were subject to
deportation without time limitations.
A critical juncture in deportation matters in the U.S.
occurred in 1931 when Reuben Oppenheimer authored a report on
the subject as part of the National Commission on Law Observance
and Enforcement (Wickersham Commission). The report outlined
considerable problems with the deportation process since it merged
‘investigatory,
prosecutor,
and
judgment
functions’.143
Oppenheimer emphasised the human rights concerns at the heart of
deportation and noted the U.S. Supreme Court’s own dicta in Fong
Yue Ting v. United States (1893) lamenting the dire impact of
forcibly removing an alien from his or her family, community and
possessions.144 While scholars, such as Moloney, point out that no
substantive changes can be directly linked to Oppenheimer’s report,
it marks the first time such concerns became part of the official
record.
By 1952, substantial attention was being paid to deportation
on the national level. The Immigration Act 1952 essentially
consolidated many of the restrictions found in the earlier acts but
also provided for relief from deportation such as the suspension
provision (which was later deemed unconstitutional on other
grounds145), the opportunity for voluntary departure, adjustment of
status, and stay of deportation.146 The law eliminated time
142
143
144
145
146

Id.
MOLONEY, supra note 6, at 204.
Id. at 205.
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
HING, supra note 137, at 211.
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limitations on most deportations.147 Most notable about this law was
its creation of fair hearing procedures before a special officer.148
The Immigration Act 1965 eliminated national origin immigration
quotas, establishing new criteria for immigrants.149 As immigration
has increased from Latin America, particularly Mexico, resulting in
a large pool of illegal immigrants new attempts were made to
reform the system in the Immigrant Reform and Control Act of
1986 and the Immigration Act of 1990. However this legislation has
been unable to reconcile the often contradictory political and
economic imperative and balance natural rights (or civil rights)
notions of individual immigrants versus a positivist notion of the
rights and security approach to American borders.
An Overview of the U.S. Removals Process
The issue of immigration policy is a perennial, politically
polarising issue in the U.S. Immigration policy debates are
complicated, involving economic, due process and human rights
and national security concerns of which deportations and removals
are only on aspect. Nevertheless, removals involve a significant
numbers of individuals. In FY 2013, the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Agency reported 133,551 removals.150 While
questions of defining the American political community is the
domain of Congress and the President, American jurisprudence is
marked by the role of courts in defining the contours of public
147

Id. (some grounds for deportation continued to be limited, such as
confinement in a mental institution, becoming a public charge or any conviction
for a violation of alien registration requirements).
148
Id.
149
These are: (1) unmarried adult sons and daughters of citizens; (2) spouses and
unmarried sons and daughters of permanent residents; (3) professionals,
scientists, and artists of exceptional ability; (4) married adult sons and daughters
of U.S. citizens; (5) siblings of adult citizens; (6) workers, skilled and unskilled,
in occupations for which labor was in short supply in the U.S.; and (7) refugees
from Communist-dominated countries or those uprooted by natural catastrophe.
150
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), ERO Annual Report
(2013) https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/2013-ice-immigrationremovals.pdf.
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policy insofar as it affects liberty interests. In the immigration
policy domain, however, U.S. courts, have historically deferred to
Congress (or the President) in determining process rights for
migrants facing deportation. Similar to courts in New Zealand and
Canada, U.S. courts will review final decisions, under very limited
circumstances, to ensure they conform to only the most minimal of
process rights consistent with the U.S. Constitution.
In the 19th century, immigration regulation function was
seen as part of the constitution’s sovereign powers, arising in part
due to the notion that immigration policy implicates foreign
relations power, which is an exclusively federal realm.151 The U.S.
Supreme Court has consistently noted that “over no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is
over the admission of aliens.”152 While the U.S. Constitution was
silent on this particular point, the Supreme Court in Fong Yue Ting
held that constitutional protections do not apply to removal of
resident aliens.153 However, it has long acknowledged the severity
of deportations when noting that removal “may result . . .. in loss of
both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living” and
has required some measure of due process under the 5th and 14th
151

“It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has
the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid
the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such
cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. In the U.S. this
power is vested in the national government, to which the Constitution has
committed the entire control of international relations, in peace as well as in war.
It belongs to the political department of the government, and may be exercised
either through treaties made by the President and Senate, or through statutes
enacted by Congress, upon whom the Constitution has conferred power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, including the entrance of ships, the
importation of goods and the bringing of persons into the ports of the U.S.; to
establish a uniform rule of naturalization; to declare war, and to provide and
maintain armies and navies; and to make all laws which may be necessary and
proper for carrying into effect these powers and all other powers vested by the
Constitution in the government of the U.S. or in any department or officer
thereof.” Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (citation
omitted).
152
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
153
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
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Amendments and a habeas corpus action if unlawfully
incarcerated.154 Yet it has held that these proceedings are
nonetheless administrative, hence civil not criminal in nature. As
such, as non-criminal proceedings, the individual is not entitled to
the full protections of the U.S. Constitution including having
limited basic rights such as the ability to cross-examine witnesses or
the option to petition for a pardon.155 Noted by the Court in Fong
Yue Ting:
The order of deportation is not a punishment for
crime. It is not a banishment, in the sense in which
that word is often applied to the expulsion of a
citizen from his country by way of punishment. It is
but a method of enforcing the return to his own
country of an alien who has not complied with the
conditions upon the performance of which the
government of the nation, acting within its
constitutional authority, and through the proper
departments, has determined that his continuing to
reside here shall depend.156
Thus, the courts have permitted Congress and the President
wide latitude in this area, with the concomitant limited recourse for
the immigrant facing deportation. Executive decisions to exclude or
deport were considered by the courts to be part of the executive’s
authority under plenary powers doctrine, and not subject to judicial
review. As such removal decisions are based on a habeas corpus
review with expansive deference to Executive prerogatives and
legal conclusions. The courts refused to review the factual basis of
the decisions.157
154

Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276,284 (1922); Wan Shing v. United States,
140 U.S. 424 (1891).
155
MOLONEY, supra note 6, at 199.
156
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730.
157
“Until the enactment of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, the sole
means by which an alien could test the legality of his or her deportation order was
by bringing a habeas corpus action in district court. In such cases, other than the
question whether there was some evidence to support the order, the courts
generally did not review factual determinations made by the Executive. However,
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The continuing rise in deportations has its policy origins in
the 1990s with the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Its policy origins are
further rooted within the political context of that era demanding a
firmer law and order posture in domestic criminal justice policy.158
Importantly, these changes were made retroactively, ensnaring
many individuals who had lived nearly their entire lives in the U.S.
in removal proceedings, and eventually on to countries in which
they had little to no family or community networks.159 These
individuals were not afforded a right to counsel (counsel could be
procured at the detained individual’s own expense) during the
Bureau of Immigration Appeals process. The 1996 Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) also limited habeas
corpus rights for non-citizens. At the same time, the rise in
removals has often led to indefinite detention awaiting removal and
has led to domestic and international criticism. The 2005 REAL ID
Act continued to tighten removal provisions, narrow appeals rights
to aggrieved non-citizens and expand the scope of terror-related
activity making an alien inadmissible or deportable, as well as
ineligible for certain forms of relief from removal.160
Removal proceedings are handled either through a normal
process with a hearing before an immigration judge and subsequent
appeals procedure or an “expedited track.” Expedited removals are
conducted for aliens who are convicted of ‘aggravated felonies’.161
These proceedings are meant to occur while the inmate is
incarcerated for the underlying offense and can even be entered at
time of sentencing by a U.S. District Court judge provided certain
conditions are met.162 This process is required by statute to adhere
they did review the Executive's legal determinations.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289, 306 (2001).
158
MOLONEY, supra note 6.
159
Id. at 219.
160
MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE & TODD TATELMAN,
CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS, IMMIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR
PROVISIONS OF THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005 (2005).
161
8 U.S.C. § 1228 (a)(3) (2013).
162
8 U.S.C. § 1228 (c)(1).
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to only minimal due process or natural justice principles. Evidence
must be received, a record maintained and the prospective deportee
must have adequate notice and information concerning the grounds
for deportation.163 Monitoring and evaluation is provided by the
Attorney General and Comptroller General. Essentially, the process
is designed in order to verify the prospective deportees’ identity and
to affirm the grounds for removal. There is a limited right to appeal
afforded the prospective deportee.164
The usual process is where the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) commences a removal proceeding of a non-citizen
it wishes to remove by serving a “notice to appear” on the
immigrant individuals non-citizen.165 DHS is usually represented by
an assistant chief counsel in Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), an agency of DHS. The immigration judges are part of the
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ), which is a part of
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and operates
under the authority of the Attorney-General. Unlike the process
currently employed in New Zealand, for example, prospective
deportees are permitted a hearing in front of the immigration judge,
who must conduct an impartial proceeding where the DHS and the
non-citizen are opposing parties.166 An opportunity for the
production of evidence, including testimony, is afforded the
prospective deportee. At the same time, this is not a judicial
proceeding but an administrative one, employing a lower standard
of proof justifying deportation and far fewer protections than a
criminal defendant is afforded. The burden of proof is on the noncitizen to show they are admissible or non-deportable.167
As an initial matter, the immigration judge determines if the
immigrant may be removed under any of the statutorily enumerated
163

8 U.S.C. § 1228 (b)(4)(A)-(F).
8 U.S.C. § 1228 (3)(A)(i).
165
I owe a description of the initial determination and review process discussed
below to Stephen H. Legomsky, author of Fortieth Annual Administrative Law
Issue: Immigration Law and Adjudication: Restructuring Immigration
Adjudication, 59 Duke L.J. 1635, 1641-44 (2010).
166
8 U.S.C § 1229.
167
8 U.S.C § 1229 (c)(2).
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grounds, such as criminal activity, security risks, or unlawful entry
into the U.S.168 If the judge determines that the individual is either
inadmissible or subject to removal, the immigration judge then
decides any affirmative applications for relief (i.e. asylum and a
narrower remedy called “restriction on removal”169) which may
have been filed by the immigrant.170 The judge then renders an oral
or written decision at the conclusion of the hearing which includes a
formal order directing the person be removed from the U.S.,
terminating the proceedings, or otherwise disposing of the case.171
Either of the parties may appeal the decisions to the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which is part of EOIR under the
authority of the Department of Justice and the Attorney General. A
filing of an appeal must be made within thirty (30) days of the
immigration judge’s decision and order and automatically stays the
initial order pending the outcome of the appeal. The attorney
general appoints the members of the BIA, establishes its procedures
and can review individual decisions.172 A large majority of the
cases decided by the BIA are decided by single member panels and,
within a specified number of categories, may be made by providing
reasons. The appellate process entails a review of the immigration
judge’s legal conclusions and discretionary decisions de novo, but
due to reforms enacted in 2002, the appellate review may not

168

8 U.S.C §§ 1182, 1227.
“Asylum, which is discretionary, enables the recipient to remain in the U.S.
and, subject to some limitations, to bring in a spouse and children. Withholding
of removal merely immunizes the person from return to the country in which his
or her life or freedom is threatened (not from return to a third country), and it
makes no provision for the admission of family members.” Legomsky, supra
note 165, at 1642 n.19.
170
8 U.S.C § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (the consideration of properly filed affirmative
applications for relief usually a determination of whether the individual has met
the statutory requirements for relief an whether the discretion of the judge should
be exercised under the individual circumstances).
171
8 C.F.R. § 1240.
172
8 C.F.R. § 1003.
169

284

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY

Vol. 35.2

reverse factual findings, including credibility determinations, unless
they are “clearly erroneous.”173
The Federal Court may review the BIA decision and lower
decision by the immigration judge. The judicial review is not done
in the federal district court. Rather the only procedure for obtaining
a review of an immigration decision to file a review petition in the
court of appeals for the circuit in which the initial immigration
hearing took place. The petition must be filed within thirty (30)
days of the final order of removal and cannot be extended.174
Consistent with the idea that immigration matters are issues
of a “political” nature, there are significant restrictions of the
judicial review process. First, The Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”)
barred judicial review of removal orders for non-citizens convicted
of certain crimes.175 Second, it prevents judicial review of certain
discretionary acts and decisions in the immigration process of the
Attorney General and his agents. As amended in 1996 and 2005, the
INA precludes judicial review of certain discretionary waivers from
removal, as well as any other discretionary decision (except for the
grant of asylum), while constitutional claims and questions of law
remain reviewable by the courts of appeals.176 Third, the appeals
court may not remand cases to the BIA for further fact finding
under the Hobbs Act standard, which allows for the court to require
further fact finding where the additional evidence is material and
there exists reasonable grounds for failure to adduce the evidence
before the agency.177 Finally, with passage of the REAL ID Act in
2005178 Congress eliminated habeas jurisdiction for removal orders
173

Jill E. Family, Stripping Judicial Review During Immigration Reform: The
Certificate of Reviewability, 8 Nev. L.J. 499, 502-03 (2008).
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Id,
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Report to the House of Delegates, A.B.A. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION,
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
Judicial_Review_of_Immigration_Decisions_1.authcheckdam.pdf.
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28 U.S.C. § 2347(c).
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Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
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(except expedited removal). The courts of appeals continue to
review constitutional claims and questions of law and have
authority for habeas corpus review.
Deportation Under U.S. Laws
There are several grounds under current U.S. law upon
which one may be deported. Besides the rather pedestrian matters
related to visa applications used to gain entry to the country are,
grounds for deportation include: smuggling179; marriage fraud180;
assorted criminal offences, including aggravated felonies181, failure
to register as a sex offender182 and drug related convictions183;
being a drug abuser or addict184; firearms offenses185; espionage186;
domestic violence and violations of protection orders187;
trafficking188; being a public charge within five years of arrival in
U.S.189; being an unlawful voter190; and the rather amorphous
category of those deemed not to be within the American ‘foreign
policy’ interest.191
Importantly, U.S. immigration law provides a sliding scale
of process rights afforded to a prospective deportee based on the
factual circumstances leading to the person’s presence and grounds
for removal. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), for
179

8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(1)(E).
8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(1)(G).
181
8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(iii) (aggravated felonies are defined in 8 USC §
1101(a)(43) and include such serious violent offenses as rape (A), murder (A)
and sexual abuse of a minor (A) but also include offenses such as forgery (R),
theft (G) and prostitution (K)).
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8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(v).
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8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(B).
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instance, distinguishes between circumstances of the migrant’s
arrival in the U.S. and grounds for deportation arising from criminal
convictions. Moreover, the removal policy has been marked by a
shift towards encouraging prospective deportees to voluntarily
depart the U.S., thereby waiving their due process rights all
together.192 These ‘voluntary departures’ are handled at the
immigration officer stage with the individuals electing this process
never appearing before a judge. This may benefit migrants because
they are more quickly freed to return to their home country rather
than face the possibility of indeterminate detention in the U. S.
(awaiting final determination of their deportation).193 In addition,
since the individual voluntarily returned, their ability to apply to
return to the U.S. is significantly shorter than those individuals
contesting deportation who are ultimately involuntarily removed.
This option is unavailable to ‘aggravated felons’ and those
suspected of terrorist links.
While this mechanism is of increasing importance in the
execution of U.S. immigration policy, use of the immigration judge
process is still the most common form of removal. These quasijudicial proceedings operate in a manner similar to normal court
proceedings with evidence and testimony. In addition, individuals
can choose to enter into a stipulated order of removal at this stage,
which foregoes the full proceeding. This approach has proven
controversial since many such agreements are executed without the
benefit of counsel, an otherwise fundamental right in the U.S.
Another vehicle for case resolution in the immigration judge stage
of proceedings is through the ‘expedited removal proceeding’
established by the 1996 Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). This special process applies only to
those immigrants who are not seeking asylum or are similarly
situated individuals who entered unlawfully and have been in the
U.S. for less than two years and are otherwise ineligible for
admission to the U.S. as normal applicants, often due to defects in
192

8 U.S.C. § 1229 (c).
There are however significant issues regarding due process in these
situations. See United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2010).
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the visa application process.194 This process has been used primarily
in border contexts.
The INA also permits expedited removals for so-called
‘aggravated felons’.195 This process is more akin to the New
Zealand deportation process in that it circumvents the judicial (or
quasi-judicial) process all together. Here, an executive official
serves a document called a ‘Final Administrative Deportation
Order’ on the aggravated felon proposed for removal. This provides
for an executive review (without a judge) and a hearing where the
proposed deportee can review evidence against them and be
represented by counsel (though counsel will not be provided for
them at state expense). This second official receives all of the
evidence submitted by the first executive official and anything
offered by the proposed deportee. In essence, the second official’s
function is to confirm the veracity of the claims made in the Final
Administrative Deportation Order, including verification of
identity, and if so satisfied, to affirm the deportation. If this order is
affirmed, then the individual is deported after fourteen (14) days,
provided that an appeal of this decision is not lodged within that
time frame.
The minimal impact of domestic constitutional standards
must be understood with the context of various international legal
instruments that have an import in U.S. deportation matters. An
international instrument often invoked to thwart government
attempts at removal is the UN Convention Against Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT).196 As the
title suggests, the treaty obligates signatories to not only refrain
from the use of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of
people but also forbids the transfer of an individual where
substantial grounds exist to believe the person would be in danger
of torture in the country of destination.
While the proscription against removal appears to be strong,
CAT, Article 3, does not expressly prohibit persons from being
194
195
196
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removed to countries where they would face cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment not rising to the level of torture.197 Thus, in the
wake of CAT, a nation, in order to deport someone to a third
country, must make a determination that includes taking into
account ‘all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the
existence in the state concerned of a consistent pattern of gross,
flagrant, or mass violations of human rights’.198 The Presidential
message accompanying this Convention to Congress included an
instruction that authorities charged with making such
determinations must decide whether and to what extent these
considerations are relevant in a particular case.199 Similar to other
removal provisions, the responsible international monitoring body
has interpreted the burden of proof to be on an applicant for nonremoval.200
The CAT covers acts of torture committed by or at the
acquiescence of a public official.201 The threshold standard would
be that an expulsion is prohibited where it is deemed more likely
than not that torture would ensue.202 All the evidence required, at a
minimum threshold, is ‘credible testimony’203 of torture. But this
evidence must not be of a general nature. The BIA, as the Appellate
administrative body within EOIR, has held that the evidence
concerning likelihood of torture must be particularised to the
individual proposed for removal. Evidence of other, similarly
situated individuals is insufficient. In sum, the victim of torture
must be the applicant, and he or she must furnish evidence of a
pattern of gross human rights violations within the community
together with any other relevant information. In domestic law, the
197
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Foreign Affairs Reform and Restoration Act of 1998, (FARRA)
states unambiguously that the policy of the U.S. is to not expel,
extradite or involuntarily remove a person to a country where there
are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in
danger of torture.204 Notwithstanding this prohibition, the
government can still deport if under Immigration and Nationality
Act where the individual has been convicted of a particularly
serious crime and is, as such, a danger to the community in the
U.S.205
Individuals often invoke Article 3 of CAT to appeal under
FARRA after a final order of alien removal under section 242 INA
section 2242(d) but have not had much success.206 In 2007, there
were 28,130 claims made under CAT; only 541 succeeded.207 In
four years following CAT implementation, 1,700 aliens were
granted deferral. The appeals that have been made, however, have
resulted in some guidance on what conditions must be present in
order to establish one’s burden of proof. For instance, the Sixth
Circuit suggested that long stays in substandard prisons are not
considered ‘torture’ within the meaning of CAT but, rapes,
domestic violence permitted by local law enforcement and
intentional cigarette burns by police might be considered torture.208
Other than these few opportunities to avail themselves to
international legal documents there are limited opportunities for
individuals to have a removal order quashed or cancelled on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds. Setting aside those
individuals applying as refugees or for asylum,209 there are two
204
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primary ways of avoiding deportation once the deportation process
is complete and an adverse determination has been made: the

successfully rebut the presumption of future persecution, the burden reverts back
to the applicant to demonstrate eligibility for a humanitarian grant of asylum
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii)(A) or (B). The BIA and courts of appeals
have often stressed that an applicant must still demonstrate past persecution in
order to be eligible for humanitarian asylum. Mambwe v. Holder, 572 F.3d 540,
549 (8th Cir. 2009), Ben Hamida v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 734, 741 (6th Cir. 2007),
Matter of L-S-, 25 I&N Dec. 705, 710 (BIA 2012). The individual than has the
opportunity to show that he/she has compelling reasons to be fearful and
unwilling to return to the home country because of past persecution. 8 C.F.R. §
1208.13(b)(1)(ii)(A). Individual may be eligible for humanitarian asylum on
these grounds when they have suffered “an atrocious form of persecution that
results in continuing physical pain and discomfort.” Matter of L-S-, at 712. Put
another way, the applicant must establish that the “past persecution was so severe
that repatriation would be inhumane.” Abrha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 1072, 1076
(8th Cir. 2006). The focus of the inquiry is on the degree of harm suffered, the
length of time over which the harm was inflicted, and the lingering physical
and/or psychological effects of the harm. Id. Alternatively, the applicant may
qualify based on a reasonable probability of other serious harm upon removal to
the country of origin. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii)(B). The serious harm need not
be inflicted on account of a Convention on the Status of Refugees ground, or
even in connection with the past persecution, but it must be so serious that it
equals the severity of persecution. Determinations of when other serious harm
rises to this level are best made on a case-by-case basis. In its most recent
decision on humanitarian asylum the BIA provided a litany of examples of
situations that might reach that level. In one case involving an LGBT applicant
the Ninth Circuit held that internal relocation was not available to a gay HIV+
Mexican man who would face “unemployment, a lack of health insurance, and
the unavailability of necessary medications in Mexico to treat his disease,”
because he would likely experience other serious harm. Id. (citing Boer-Sedano
v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2005)). Other examples of serious
harm could include: extreme circumstances of inadequate health care, Pllumi v.
Att’y Gen. of U.S., 642 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 2011); mental anguish of a mother
who was a victim of FGM having to choose between abandoning her child or
seeing the child suffer the same fate, Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 152-53 (2d
Cir. 2010); or unavailability of psychiatric medication necessary for the applicant
to function, Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 555, 577 (7th Cir. 2008). Asylum
Basics: Elements of Asylum Law, 3.5 Humanitarian Asylum, IMMIGRATION
EQUALITY,
http://immigrationequality.org/issues/law-library/lgbth-asylummanual/asylum-basics-elements-asylum-law/.
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prospective deportee can seek a cancellation or suspension of the
order to deport. Essentially, these procedures embody consideration
of the ‘humanitarian’ principles discussed above. These steps can
be thought of as pleas for leniency after a decision has been handed
down. The deportation determinations process is quite mechanistic
or ministerial in its preoccupation with merely establishing the
grounds for removal, matching them with applicable statutory
standards on such grounds and providing a second set of eyes to
verify the veracity of the grounds for removal, including verifying
the identity of the proffered deportee. Only after the decision to
remove has been reached, will the court consider the possibility of
cancelling the order of removal.

V. ANALYSIS
Under U.S. law, once one is subject to a removal order, he
or she can apply for a cancellation of the order.210 Cancellation is
the functional equivalent of establishing humanitarian grounds for
remaining in either Canada or New Zealand following an order of
removal. Importantly, those deported under the expedited process
are not eligible to apply for cancellation of the removal.211 Both
permanent and temporary residents may apply for cancellation,
though the requirements for temporary residents are more onerous.
In essence, the Attorney General “may” cancel removal when
certain prerequisites are met —- such as length of residence in the
U.S.;212 is of good moral character;213 has not been convicted of
certain offenses not included within the ‘aggravated felonies’
category;214 and the potential deportee establishes that removal
would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the
alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the U.S. or an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”215 Special
210
211
212
213
214
215
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provision is also made for cancellation of removal orders for
victims of domestic violence within this section.216 In essence, the
mechanism of cancellation serves as a final review mechanism in
which evidence concerning mitigating humanitarian considerations
can be taken into account as a final step in the process. While the
law makes no specific provision for the presentation of international
obligations in this section and indeed contains no requirement that
the reviewing authority consider them, there is no bar to their
inclusion at this stage. Certainly, given the fact of the order of
removal the only question remaining is whether these other factors
should militate against the execution of the removal. Cancellation
will return the person to status of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence still subject to all of the laws pertaining to
prospective residents. Moreover, while ostensibly a vehicle for
humanitarian concerns to thwart removal, the law limits the number
of cancellations that Attorney General may grant to 4,000 per
year.217
The above discussion shows significant commonalities
across the removal process and humanitarian and compassionate
appeals in these three countries. The U.S. immigration law
maintains ostensibly humanitarian factors in its administration of
immigration decisions through the cancellations process. New
Zealand immigration officials are permitted to consider such factors
along with international obligations when determining whether or
not to issue deportation orders. Canadian courts have determined a
six-factor test to determining a humanitarian and compassionate
appeal of deportation. In each case, the ‘alien’ is deemed to have
lesser substantive rights than citizens. Judicial review in all three
cases is limited to verifying that only minimal aspects of natural
justice rights have been met during the respective administrative
processes. New Zealand’s process seems to require the least in
terms of even these minimum requirements by not requiring a
record be kept by the immigration officer as to the considerations of
international humanitarian authority, if any, considered in the
216
217
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decision-making process. Furthermore, all three countries share
public safety, national security or foreign policy interests as factors
of consideration in such proceedings.
This similarity of law is reflected by shared interests in the
underlying immigration national policies. In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries’ immigration policy in all three states had
similar racialist ethos and economic development considerations.
Later they encouraged open immigration system designed to fuel
economic growth but retained a strong racialist or native bias
against various classes of immigrants.218 The post-War, postcolonialist world saw all states move away from explicit racial or
ethnic categories to an immigration system founded on national
economic development, family unification and protection of
refugees and other person who have been subject to discrimination,
persecution or other humanitarian and political tragedies. Despite
their different constitutional bases the courts and the legislation of
each state when considering immigration issues have taken
constitution principles, rules and values, which include concern of
governmental power and individual rights and dignity (both natural,
positive and common law), have been imported in the public
administrative law to create unique areas of the law. Thus
paradoxically due process considerations are embedded within
plenary power.
Against this common policy and legal background, all the
states have retained, without significant judicial review or
constitutional scrutiny, the right to remove undesirable non-citizens.
While the amount of removals as a percentage of the total
immigrant populations remains small, they have been averaging
between one percent and three percent (1%-3%) per annum in the
U.S., the overall trend since the late 1990’s has been moving
towards increasing removals.219 This increase of removals has been
enabled by a narrowing of the class of individuals ineligible for
permanent residency and who may not appeal their exclusion or
removal. Moreover, process changes such as “fast-track”
218
219
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procedures to expedite removal together with an expansion of
executive discretion and the lessening of judicial scrutiny of factual
and legal determinations of humanitarian and compassionate
appeals have combined to create significant burdens to avoid
removal.
Why these various states have all streamlined their removal
procedures and limited appeals from each individual state is an
issue beyond the scope of this paper. Various factors, from the
securitization of immigration issue with the rise of fundamentalism
in the post-cold war world, to economic uncertainty, xenophobia
and nativist sentiment, the perceived failure of assimilative and
multicultural policies have been noted. Whatever the cause, it is
evident that the sovereign prerogative as embodied by executive or
ministerial authority continues to dominate and is becoming
increasingly dominant in this area of the law. The narrowing of
humanitarian and compassionate appeals are bound up in this
process. Yet it is clear the humanitarian and compassionate factors
can be important considerations for cancelling or quashing removal
or exclusion decisions in each state.

VI. CONCLUSION
It is evident with the consideration of the three jurisdictions
that humanitarian and compassionate appeals have become more
difficult to make and win. Legislation in all three states have
precluded certain classes of individuals from making an appeal and
the facts relating to personal hardship which may be placed before
the appropriate authority have been circumscribed and conditioned.
Constitutional and international legal obligations which may be
appropriate and in other instances are incorporated into domestic
law are often read down, overlooked or ignored. First, the classes of
individuals excluded individuals who may not apply for these
appeals have been expanded – particularly in those categories
related to terrorism and serious crime. These expanded classes
reflect an increased national security orientation found in
immigration law and policy. This security orientation has
accompanied a renewed paradoxical notion of national identity and
exclusive citizenship based on that national identity and universal
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rights. Second, the equitable factors upon which these appeals are
based have been narrowed. In all these states, the international
factors set out in instruments such as CAT which in themselves
could be used to support a “humanitarian and compassionate”
appeal are excluded from consideration or may be re-considered by
the courts if denied by the executive. These developments narrow
the broad range of family, social, emotional, medical, economic,
cultural factors and circumstances which may be relevant to these
types of appeals. Third, the range of executive discretion has
increased and has accompanied the lessening traction of
administrative, due process and constitutional review by the courts.
The governments in each state have narrowed or qualified the
factors to be reviewed (such as the seven-prong test in New
Zealand) and opened the process up to a wide relatively standardless discretion (e.g. “voluntary departures” in the U.S.). This
process has been accomplished by legislative and executive
innovation acquiesced to by the courts under separation of power
and administrative law principles. As such, there is an illusion of
wide ranging consideration. It appears that the decision maker may
consider any relevant factors but it cannot be determined whether
any prohibited or material factors are included in the decision. A
problem compounded by the use of various administrative
procedures, which prevent the development of a requisite record to
enable the court to review a decision.

